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Part I - Germany

A. Chapter Introduction
“Volkswagen faces shareholder claims over emissions scandal”1
-

Reuters News, 01/28/2016
“With Optimum Pressure - Actions for Damages against VW”2
-

F.A.Z., 09/25/2015

The VW emissions scandal is still all over the news - and with it the pending shareholder actions against the corporation. “Global civil litigation of all stripes is growing”3 and today,
securities fraud actions are by far no longer a “US-only” issue.
This paper aims to show the role of private litigation in the corporate governance debate with
a focus on German securities law and its litigation procedures. After a brief introduction to the
topic (B.), there will be an extensive discussion of the present collective redress scheme for
securities fraud actions in Germany and its implications on private enforcement (C.) and possible areas of conflict will be pointed out (D.). A brief summary of the most important points
and an outlook will conclude (E.).
B. Private Litigation in Germany: An Overview
The topic of this paper is the role of private litigation. This should in turn be understood in the
broader context of corporate governance, thus it is vital to have a definition of what corporate
governance is. One of the most common definitions is that of the Cadbury Report: “Corporate
governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled.”4 This definition is
also the shortest and therefore very handy.5 Now how exactly are companies essentially controlled? There are two basic control mechanisms, namely internal control from within the
company and external control from without. External control is achieved through regulation,
which in turn has to be enforced to be effective.6 Legal research is in agreement that there are

1

Wissenbach, Volkswagen Emissions Lawsuit.
Budras, Schadensersatzklagen gegen VW.
3
Iwata, Securities-fraud suits go global.
4
Cadbury, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 15.
5
See for a comparison of other definitions: Clarke, International Corporate Governance, 1-2.
6
Dharmastuti/Wahyudi, 4:4 R.J.F.A., 132-134 (2013).
2
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basically two types of regulation enforcement mechanisms namely public enforcement and
private enforcement.7
Public enforcement is based on an ex-ante perspective. In order to create a working market
infrastructure, statutory regulations are passed to deter company misconduct before it happens.8 If violated, these regulations are enforced by state authorities through sanctions or even
by means of criminal prosecution.9
Private enforcement on the other hand is characterized by an ex-post view. Civil liability of a
corporation for past misbehavior has a deterring effect, thus preventing repeated violation of
statutory regulations.10 Through this deterrence effect, when suing a company, private individuals are in fact enforcing statutory regulations. This in turn means they promote a public
interest, making them something that has become known in legal literature as “private attorney general”.11
Private enforcement mechanisms can be found in different areas of the law, most notably antitrust law and capital markets / securities law. Private enforcement has traditionally not played
a big role in German anti-trust law12, though in recent years, there was a lot of effort on EU
level concerning collective redress and reforms have been passed aiming to promote private
litigation in the area of competition law.13
The focus of this research however is not on anti-trust law but on securities law. Taking a
closer look at the securities market, one will find that there is a natural asymmetry of information in the capital market. Only the capital seeker (issuer of securities) initially has all the
relevant company information which the capital provider (investor) needs in order to make a
sound investment decision.14 Yet to prevent market failure, these information asymmetries
have to be leveled out. This is achieved by creating a set of disclosure and publication obliga7

Arguably market control is a third mechanism inducing corporations to comply with legal requirements all on
their own, e.g. because they rely on the trust of the market for ‘repeat transactions’. However the effectiveness of
market control is heavily doubted, see Brellochs, Publizität und Haftung von Aktiengesellschaften, 174-176.
8
Porrini/Ramello, 3:2 J.F.E.P., 143-144 (2011).
9
Criminal prosecution can be seen as a form of public enforcement, even though it is sometimes listed as a separate enforcement mechanism, see e.g.: Ramphal, The Role of Public and Private Litigation in the Enforcement of
Securities Laws in the United States, 10.
10
Porrini/Ramello, 3:2 J.F.E.P., 142-143 (2011).
11
Baetge/Eichholtz, Die Class Action in den USA, 315; Reuschle, WM 2004, 966 (970); Hopt, WM 2009, 1873
(1879-1880); Sometimes the term „private public attorney” is used, see Hess, JZ 2011, 66 (67).
12
Buxbaum, 23:3 Berkley J. Int’l L., 484 (2005).
13
KK KapMuG / Hess, Einl., RN 2, 54; The concept of private law enforcement in Germany was first explicitly
taken up on in the “7th Cartel Law Novella” of 2005, see Hess, JZ 2011, 66 (67). Very recently 2014/104/EU
directive has been passed by the European Parliament and the Council, aiming to promote private litigation. Its
possible impact on private law enforcement in German competition law is however disputed, see Keßler, VuR
2015, 83 (83-84, 91); For a comprehensive overview of the development of collective redress in Europe in recent
years, see Haar, Investor protection through model case procedures (CFS Working Paper No. 2013/21), 4-17.
14
Brellochs, Publizität und Haftung von Aktiengesellschaften, 166.
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tions for corporations, providing the investor with the needed information.15 Thus disclosure
obligations play a key role in maintaining a functioning capital market.16
As with any regulation, these disclosure obligations may be publicly and/or privately enforced. Historically, public enforcement has always played the predominant role in the European Union.17 The same holds true for Germany in particular.18 Public corporate surveillance
is achieved through a three-tier monitoring and enforcement system consisting of the German
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht,
short: BaFin), the States of Germany and the Stock Exchanges.19
However, German Law does also provide the vehicles for private enforcement. Similar to US
law there are possibilities for bringing either a derivative suit (Aktionärsklage) or a direct suit
against the corporation.20 In general, derivative suits are seen as unattractive for individual
investors.21 The main reason is that while the shareholder bears the full cost risk of litigation in German Law at least concerning the approval procedure (Zulassungsverfahren), pursuant to
§ 148 para. 6 sent. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz - AktG)22 - only the
corporation itself profits directly from a successful trial.23 Thus the derivative suit has not
been popularly used in Germany.24 Up until today there are only three published court decisions concerning shareholder derivative suit.25
Now this leaves the direct suit of the investor against the corporation for enforcing liability
because of violations of disclosure requirements. In most cases it is in practice too risky while
at the same time too expensive for an individual investor to bring a case against a company.26
This effect, known as “rational disinterest” or “rational apathy”, in turn impedes the enforcement of disclosure obligations through private individuals.27

15

Brellochs, Publizität und Haftung von Aktiengesellschaften, 167.
Brellochs, Publizität und Haftung von Aktiengesellschaften, 1.
17
Russell, 28:14 B. U. Int’l L. J., 142 (2010).
18
Hopt, WM 2009, 1873 (1879).
19
Hdb. Kapitalanlagerecht, 3rd Ed. / von Rosen, § 2 RN 224-267; Claussen, Bank- und Börsenrecht / Bröcker, §
6 RN 27.
20
Brellochs, Publizität und Haftung von Aktiengesellschaften, 185.
21
Ramphal, The Role of Public and Private Litigation in the Enforcement of Securities Laws in the United
States, 12.
22
Aktiengesetz - AktG, as of December 22 2015, BGBl. I 1965, p. 1089.
23
KK KapMuG / Hess, Einl., RN 15.
24
Haar/Grechenig, AG 2013, 653 (654-655, 662); Habersack, Staatliche und halbstaatliche Eingriffe in die
Unternehmensführung, E92; It has been suggested to institute a „bounty“-system in order to create monetary
incentives for the suing shareholder and this way encourage more derivative suits, see Schmolke, ZGR 2011, 398
(434-437). This approach however is not unquestioned, see (crit.) Kahnert, AG 2013, 663 (670).
25
OLG Hamburg, AG 2007, 331; LG München I, NZG 2007, 477; OLG München, NZG 2010, 1392.
26
Hellgardt, Kapitalmarktdeliktsrecht, 546-547.
27
Bergmeister, KapMuG, S. 27; Hellgardt, Kapitalmarktdeliktsrecht, 546-547.
16
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The most important way to counter this effect and encourage private litigation is for the legislation to provide a collective redress scheme.28 Collective redress schemes enable a multitude
of plaintiffs and/or a multitude of defendants to join together and collectively litigate in front
of a court.29 By this way minimizing the costs and risks for individual investors, a system for
collective redress is a prerequisite for effective private litigation.30 The following will explore
what kind of collective redress scheme is implemented in Germany in securities and capital
market disputes and whether or not or how it promotes private litigation.
C. Collective Redress in Germany: KapMuG
Up until today, the Zivilprozessordnung31 (ZPO) as the central code for German civil procedural law provides no possibility for bringing a collective suit to court.32 This is largely due to
the fact that German civil procedural law is traditionally based on the concept of a two-partyprocess33 and since its first introduction in 1877 there was no aspiration to change the core
principles on which the ZPO is based on.34 Especially in recent years, there have been some
major reforms;35 however no collective redress scheme has been incorporated into the ZPO so
far. Outside the provisions of the ZPO though, there are in certain areas of civil law possibilities for collective redress, most notably the German “Capital Markets Model Procedure Act”
(Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz36 or short: “KapMuG”), which applies to shareholder
actions for damages (and certain fulfillment duties) in securities markets disputes.37
The following will give a brief overview over the development of the KapMuG (I.) before
going into the details of its procedure (II.) and analyzing its actual impact (III.).
I. Development
In 2000 and 2001, allegations were made against Deutsche Telekom AG concerning misrepresentation and failure to disclose material information. The two main (albeit not the only) alle28

Russell, 28:14 B. U. Int’l L. J., 144 (2010).
KK KapMuG / Hess, Einl., RN 1.
30
Schäfer, Anreizwirkungen bei der Class Action und der Verbandsklage, 70.
31
Zivilprozessordnung - ZPO, as of November 20 2015, BGBl. 2005 I p. 3202; 2006 I p. 431; 2007 I p. 1781
32
There is the possibility under § 79 para. 2 No. 3 ZPO for consumers association to collect consumers’ claims
and litigate in their own name those claims. This is however the only procedure that could be considered a collective redress scheme, see Hess, JZ 2011, 66 (66).
33
Langenbucher, Aktien- und Kapitalmarktrecht, § 21 RN 3.
34
Hess, JZ 2011, 66 (66).
35
Notable changes include the reform of arbitration law in 1998 as well as the ZPO reforms of 2002, 2004 and
2009, see Hess, JZ 2011, 66 (66).
36
Gesetz über Musterverfahren in kapitalmarkrechtlichen Streitigkeiten (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz
- KapMuG), as of November 20 2015, BGBl. 2009 I, p. 2182.
37
KK KapMuG / Hess, Einl., RN 3.
29
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gations made were misrepresentation concerning Telekom’s real estate values and the failure
to disclose the intended acquisition of the American telephone company Voice Stream Wireless Corp..38 This led to a wave of shareholder actions against Deutsche Telekom in both
Germany and the United States.39 Over 17,000 shareholder claims were subsequently brought
to court in Germany alone, represented by around 900 different law firms.40
All of them were filed with the regional court of Frankfurt (Landgericht Frankfurt am
Main).41 This mass of cases was equal to the courts workload of 10 years.42 To get a measure
of the extent of the case, let it be said that there were very literally truckloads of documents
brought to the court building,43 one judge died during the proceeding and one was routinely
transferred44 and a complaint was filed with the constitutional court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) for undue delay in the proceeding45.
Recognizing that having so many cases to deal with at the same time was too much for any
one court to handle, on February 25th 2003 the German Government released a “Ten-Point”
action program to promote investor protection.46 This was the initial step towards the introduction of the first KapMuG47 in November of 2005.48 The original version of the act had an
expiration date on November 1st 2010, giving it five years to prove its practicality.49 Today, a
new act is in effect, which is due to expire on November 1st 2020.50
II. Proceeding
Getting a hold of the Telekom case certainly was the driving factor in the introduction of
KapMuG. However the intended goal was to strengthen shareholders rights in a more general
way, by promoting shareholder litigation. “Reestablishing the regulatory control function” of
liability statutes by introducing a collective redress scheme was the declared intention in the
38

Tilp, FS Krämer, 331 (334-335).
For a comprehensive overview over the events and timeline of the case both in Germany and the United
States, see Tilp, FS Krämer, 331 (332-360).
40
Halberstam, 021 SUNY B.L.S.R.P., 25 (2015).
41
Today, § 32b ZPO provides that the exclusive venue for shareholder litigation is to be the competent court at
the registered office of the issuer. This provision is criticized by some in legal literature to be impractical and
problematic. See Stackmann, NJW 2010, 3185 (3188), who suggests as an alternative the distribution to specialized courts.
42
PM LG Frankfurt am Main, 1.
43
Jahn, ZIP 2008, 1314 (1314).
44
Jahn, ZIP 2008, 1314 (1315); Tilp, FS Krämer, 331 (333).
45
BVerfG NJW 2004, 3320.
46
Seibert, BB 2003, 693 (693-698).
47
Gesetz über Musterverfahren in kapitalmarktrechtlichen Streitigkeiten (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz
- KapMuG), as of August 16 2005, BGBl. 2005, I p. 2437.
48
Hess/Michailidou, WM 2003, 2318 (2318).
49
BT Drucks. 15/5091, 47.
50
See § 28 KapMuG .
39
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governments justification of the KapMuG.51 In other words this meant more corporate control
through private enforcement.
Still it was made clear that there was no intention of creating a US style class action. Rather a
“model case” collective redress scheme was to be created.52 The regional court in Frankfurt
had already started off its immense task by trying to focus on ten “pilot-procedures” that covered most of the legal questions common to all cases - this way creating its own “model procedure”, albeit without statutory basis.53
By choosing a model case solution the legislator deviated from the proposal of the “Commission German Corporate Governance Codex” (Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate
Governance Kodex), which favored the solution of having a mutual representative for all (optin) shareholder plaintiffs.54 The main criticism was that the shareholders who did not choose
to opt-in could simultaneously litigate individually, which in turn could lead to different court
decisions in the same matter and did not help in lowering the overall judiciary workload.55
The concept of a model case procedure is not totally unknown to German Law. The KapMuG
had its role model in German administrative law. Pursuant to Sec. 93a, para. 1 of the Rules of
the Administrative Courts (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung - VwGO)56 a model case procedure is
possible for certain administrative actions brought to court by individual petitioners.57
The KapMuG procedure itself is divided into three basic stages, viz. application proceeding
(Antragsverfahren), intermediate proceeding (Zwischenverfahren) and continuation of the
individual proceeding (Fortsetzung des Individualverfahrens).58
1. Application Proceeding
The first step towards a KapMuG procedure is the application proceeding. The competent
court for all shareholder claims on grounds of alleged misrepresentation is the regional court
(Landgericht) at the place of the corporation’s registered office (§ 71 para. 2 No. 3 GVG59, §
32b ZPO). In the individual proceeding in front of this trial court, a motion has to be filed,
requesting a model case procedure. The motion can be filed by either the plaintiff or the defendant (§ 2 para. 1 sent. 2 KapMuG). In practice it is usually the plaintiff who seeks to initi51

BT Drucks. 15/5091, 1, 16.
Seibert, BB 2003, 693 (694-695).
53
Duve/Pfitzner, BB 2005, 673 (676).
54
BT-Drucks. 14/7515, 88-90.
55
BT Drucks. 15/5091, 50.
56
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung - VwGO, as of December 12 2015, BGBl. 1991 I p. 686.
57
Hess, ZIP 2005, 1713 (1715).
58
Halfmeier/Rott/Feess, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz im Kapitalmarktrecht, 19.
59
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz - GVG, as of December 21 2015, BGBl. 1975 I p. 1077.
52
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ate a KapMuG procedure.60 This seems odd, considering that usually the defendant too would
benefit from such a procedure by getting rid of a multitude of cases simultaneously.61 A possible explanation would be that corporations hope for tactical advantages by splitting the case
and having multiple trials.62 The motion may only be filed in first instance (§ 2 para. 1 sent. 1
KapMuG), so if a case has already gone on appeal, it can no longer be part of a KapMuG procedure. After the trial court verifies the motion’s admissibility, it is made public on the electronic litigation register (elektronisches Klageregister) pursuant to § 3 para. 2 KapMuG. The
publication is supposed to encourage other shareholders to file a similar motion in trial
court.63 This is very important because only if ten such commutated motions are filed within
six months of the first motion, does the KapMuG procedure enter its main stage, the intermediate proceeding (§ 6 para. 1 sent. 1 KapMuG).
2. Intermediate Proceeding
If the quorum is met within the given time limit, the trial court issues an order for reference to
the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) pursuant to § 6 KapMuG. In its order, the
court sets the original list of legal questions to be decided in the intermediate proceeding.
Subject of the proceeding can be the legal clarification of questions that are fundamental to all
individual cases (§ 2 para. 1 sent. 1 KapMuG). That means not the validity of the claims
themselves is decided by the Higher Regional Court, but the underlying issues which are the
same for all cases. The Higher Court may for examples decide on the question of whether a
Sales Prospectus or an ad hoc announcement issued by the corporation was incorrect or misleading.64 “Non-collectivizable“ issues however will not be decided, e.g. the individual damage65 or the limitation or forfeiture of a claim.66 During the intermediate proceeding, all individual trials that are dependent on issues of the model procedure are suspended, regardless of
whether the individual plaintiff opted in by filing a motion of request (§ 8 para. 1 KapMuG).
That means as soon as the KapMuG procedure has reached the point of the intermediate proceeding, no other individual trial regarding the same case can be held anywhere in the Federal
Republic of Germany. This has been described as the “suction” effect of the KapMuG.67
60

Stackmann, NJW 2010, 3185 (3186).
Stackmann, NJW 2010, 3185 (3186).
62
BT Drucks. 14/7515, 89.
63
Hess, ZIP 2005, 1713 (1715).
64
BT Drucks. 15/5091, 20.
65
LG München I, BeckRS 2006, 18838.
66
BGH, WM 2008, 1353 (1353).
67
This is the official term used in the Government’s Justification of the KapMuG, BT Drucks. 15/5091, 25; see
also Bergmeister, KapMuG, 226.
61
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Parties of the intermediate proceeding are the defendant and a “model plaintiff” (Musterkläger) as well as the “joined parties” (Beigeladene) consisting of all other individual plaintiffs
who have “opted-in” (§ 9 para. 1 KapMuG). The model plaintiff is selected by the court. Before making the decision the court has to give consideration to the suitability of the plaintiff in
question, the amount of this plaintiff’s claim and the will of the majority of the plaintiffs (§ 9
para. 2 KapMuG).
Now all injured shareholders who have not yet gone to court have two options. Either they
take their claim to court, in which case their individual trial will immediately be suspended
and the plaintiff will join the KapMuG procedure as a “joined party”, due to the suction effect
described above. This joining can happen at any point of the intermediate proceeding so long
as no final verdict has been reached (§ 8 para. 1 KapMuG). The other option is to register the
claim with the Higher Regional Court within six months of the initiation of the intermediate
procedure. In this case the court’s decision in the KapMuG procedure will not be legally binding for the shareholder but the limitation of the claim will still be suspended (§ 204 para. 1
No. 6a of the German Civil Code - Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)68). The differentiation
between these two options is very important, as it has far-reaching effects and sets unwanted
incentives, as will be discussed in further detail below.69
The actual procedure follows the general rules of the ZPO if not otherwise provided for in the
KapMuG (§ 11 para. 1 KapMuG). At the end of the intermediate proceeding, the Higher Regional Court will issue a legally binding decision on the questions of fact and law that were
raised (§ 16 para 1 KapMuG).
3. Continuation of the Individual Proceeding
The Higher Regional Courts decision can be brought on appeal to the Federal Court of Justice
in Germany (Bundesgerichtshof - BGH) by any party of the intermediate proceeding pursuant
to §§ 20 and 21 KapMuG. After a final verdict has been reached, the (suspended) individual
proceedings are continued at trial court level (§ 22 para. 4 KapMuG). The decisions of the
intermediate procedure are legally binding and the trial court will only have to decide on the
(legal and factual) questions that are individual for each case, e.g. extent and causation of individual damages.70

68

Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - BGB, as of November 20 2015, BGBl. 2002 I p. 42, 2909; 2003 I p. 738.
D. II. 1..
70
Halfmeier/Rott/Feess, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz im Kapitalmarktrecht, 34.
69

8

III. Analysis
The question remains whether the introduction of the KapMuG can be thought of as a success.
This section will try to give an answer to this by analyzing the actual impact the introduction
of the KapMuG has had in terms of number of cases filed.
There were four declared goals that the legislative hoped to achieve.71 The first and foremost
aim was to create greater incentive for shareholders to sue, i.e. to promote private enforcement.72 This goes hand in hand with the second declared goal, which was to make effective
enforcement easier for private individuals.73 The third aim was to lower the workload of the
courts dealing with securities fraud actions.74 Last but not least there was the growing fear
that the Federal Republic of Germany would lose its attractiveness as “justice site” (Justizstandort), considering that it was possible for shareholders to litigate claims in a foreign
country by way of “forum shopping”. This could effectively lead to a loss of Germany’s judicial control over domestic securities markets, thus the fourth goal was to increase the attractiveness of Germany as justice site.75
1. Shareholder Activity before and after KapMuG76
Starting off with the extent of shareholder action, the main question is how many such cases
are actually brought to court each year. The focus here is on suits concerning misrepresentation on secondary market. In legal literature there has been talk about a “flood” of shareholder
securities fraud actions ever since the stock market crash of 2001/2002.77 However neither
source nor actual numbers were provided. To be fair, before the dot-com collapse, there was
hardly any shareholder action against stock corporations.78 However from 2001 to 2013, there
were only exactly 111 court decisions concerning misrepresentation suits brought forward by
shareholders in all of Germany. That amounts to an average of 8-9 court decisions per year talking of a “flood” here seems (mildly speaking) not exactly on point.
Now how has this number been influenced by the introduction of the KapMuG in 2005? From
2001 to 2004 there were 24 cases, resulting in an average of 6 cases per year. From 2005 to
71
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77
Erttmann/Keul, WM 2007, 482 (482).
78
To be exact, there were six relevant court decisions in the time from 1982 to 2000.

9

2013 there were 87 cases, leading to an average of almost 10 cases per year. Seeing this increase of around 67% may seem impressive at first. Nevertheless the total number pales in
international comparison, as the following section will show.
2. Effective Enforcement through KapMuG Procedures
Turning towards the second declared goal, effective enforcement through collective redress,
the numbers grow even smaller. From 2005 until today there have been only 14 decisions in
different model cases.79 Even when excluding the starting phase80 until the first KapMuG procedure was decided in 200781, this only amounts to an average of 1.5 cases per year. By comparison, 1,607 class actions were decided in the same period of time in the US - amounting to
a total average of 178 court decisions per year.82 Now of course these numbers have to be
seen in the light of each country’s total stock market capitalization. As of 2014, stock market
capitalization in the US was 26,330,589,190,000 USD while in Germany it was only
1,738,539,060,000 USD.83 This leads to a ratio of 15.14 to 1. Yet even integrating this information there are eight class actions for every one KapMuG procedure.84
Considering this, measured on international standards, the KapMuG does not provide a collective redress scheme that is as widely accepted and used as the US securities class action.
The comparison seems especially important when thinking about another declared goal of the
KapMuG, increasing the attractiveness of Germany as justice site.
3. International Competition
As mentioned before, there was the general fear that Germany would gradually lose judicial
control over the domestic securities market.85 The most conclusive way to measure this effect
is to look at how many US class actions were filed against German companies, i.e. corporations which have their headquarters in Germany.86 An extensive search within the Securities
Class Actions Clearinghouse Filings Database reveals that there has been a total of 15 class
actions against Germany based corporations, the first one filed in 2000. During the period
from 2007 until today there were eight such cases. For the period from 2000 to 2006 that
makes an average of 1 case per year; for the period of 2007 to date, the average is 0.89 cases
79
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per year. This drop of 11% cannot be considered significant and it seems highly questionable
if it can be attributed to the introduction of the KapMuG at all.
On a side note, the German legislator’s fear of extensive forum shopping by investors on the
domestic stock market has been incidentally eased by the US Supreme Court, which in Morrisson v. National Australia Bank held that the anti-fraud provision of the SEC Rules87 does
not apply extraterritorially.88 That means German investors will no longer be able to sue corporations in the United States using US securities class action in regard to stock they purchased on a German (or other Non-US) stock exchange.89 This ultimately affirms Germany’s
judicial control over domestic stock markets.90
4. Judicial Workload
Last of all the question remains whether the introduction of the KapMuG did in any way help
in lowering the judicial workload.
In regard to the Telekom procedure, the final verdict by the Federal Court of Justice of Germany has only been spoken very recently, on October 21st 2014 and published in 2015.91 Now
that the model case has been finally decided, the individual proceedings will be continued in
front of the trial court.92 Up until today, no final court decision has been made public for any
of the trial procedures.93 That means over 15 years have passed since the first claims against
Telekom have been filed with the Regional Court of Frankfurt. By comparison, the same case
was brought to court in the US as a class action and settled in 2005 after only five years.94 The
fact that even after the introduction of the KapMuG the model procedure took almost ten
years in total - twice as long as it took the case in the US to be settled - suggests that the judicial workload in Germany has at least not been lowered to the US’ level in regard to collective redress procedures. But has it been lowered at all? The hope was that by factoring out the
elements common to all individual cases and centrally deciding on them only once (i.e. in the
model case procedure), the overall judiciary workload would be lowered.95
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SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (Sec. 10; 48 Stat. 891; 15 U.S.C. 78j) [13 FR 8183, Dec. 22, 1948, as
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However, commentators are in agreement that this goal has not been reached.96 This is attributed to the fact that the KapMuG does not change anything about the necessity of individual trials.97 In addition to this, a considerable amount of effort is necessary to just determine
the “collectivizable” material common to all cases.98 Furthermore, it is at least in theory possible for all parties to go on (individual) appeal and revision on grounds of alleged errors of
fact or law concerning issues that could only be dealt with in the individual proceedings.99
All in all the model case procedure provides no real remedy for the judicial overload generally
caused by sheer number of cases.100
5. Conclusion
The introduction of the KapMuG as a means for collective redress was nearly uniformly welcomed by scholars.101 During the course of the KapMuG reform in 2012102, the legislator even
mentioned the possibility of integrating a similar collective redress scheme into the ZPO, if it
proved itself until “sunset” in 2020.103 The hope is to have a wider scope of application for
collective redress, especially in the area of product, pharmaceutical and environmental liability.104
However the analysis above shows that the self-set goals have not entirely been met and there
is room for improvement. Private enforcement in Germany has increased in recent years but
there is still a lot of room for more, especially when looking at collective redress and in comparison with the United States. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison, the matter of
extensive forum shopping by German investors does not seem as pressing as before. Still, the
courts’ problem with handling a large number of similar cases at the same time has not effectively been eliminated by the KapMuG as there still has to be an individual trial for each
claimant.
Notwithstanding this, some of the weaknesses of the KapMuG (especially the last one mentioned) might be attributed to more fundamental and opposing principles in German civil procedure, as the following section will try to show.
96
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D. Areas of Conflict
It has already been pointed out that German Civil Procedure is based on the concept of a twoparty system with little room for a scheme of collective redress. As such, the KapMuG marks
a break with fundamental principles of German law.105
The problem has to be seen in the broader perspective of the conflicting policy objectives underlying the concept of private enforcement. Private Enforcement as part of a corporate governance system is driven by two policy objectives. These are (1.) to incentivize private action
and (2.) to efficiently handle these actions.106
I. Incentivizing Shareholder Action
As has already been explained, the main barrier for shareholder action is rational apathy because of dispersed damages. The German answer to this problem has typically been the “loser
pays rule”, which ultimately relieves the plaintiff of court and attorney fees in case his claim
is meritorious and the trial successful.107 Is this fee shifting enough though? Looking at the
numbers above, the answer seems to be no. Fee shifting is only possible up to the amount of
the (statutory) fixed fees and most of the times there will be significantly higher contractual
fee agreements (e.g. hourly rates) between the plaintiff and his lawyer.108 There is also still
the plaintiff’s risk of losing and then himself having to pay double.109 So how then can the
large number of plaintiffs in the Telekom litigation be explained? The Telekom case was an
exception because there was no rational apathy involved.110 Even though no institutional investors were part of the trial, the average individual claim was about 5,900 EUR - an amount
high enough to overcome the barriers of rational apathy.111 This was due to the fact that before its IPO, Telekom launched a huge public promotional campaign for its share, which led a
lot of private investors to invest in Telekom shares as part of their pension scheme - many of
them purchasing stocks for the first time in their lives.112
In addition to that there was a decision by the Federal High Court of Germany113, holding that
an action for damages in regard to prospectus liability in general and the Telekom case in par-
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ticular was covered by standard legal protection insurance.114 This aspect (as a further incentive to sue) however is reduced today, because most insurance companies have promptly reacted to the court decision by adapting modified terms and conditions.115
Further incentives for shareholder action could in theory be achieved through US-style contingency fees.116 A Contingency fee is a success-based remuneration of the attorney combined
with his proportional participation in the monetary damages awarded by the court.117 This
would entail the risk of abuse through the attorney.118 For fear of a “complaint industry”
Germany has traditionally been very conservative with contingent fees.119
II. Efficient Litigation
Efficiency is the second key element for private enforcement.120 Here lies the second obstacle
posed by German legislation: the constitutionally guaranteed importance of the individual
protection rights (Individualrechtsschutz). Concerning collective redress, there are two main
areas of conflict, namely (1.) pooling of claims vs. individual assertion and (2.) slender procedure vs. participation rights.
1. Pooling of Claims vs. Individual Assertion
One of the more fundamental German constitutional rights is the right to judicial access (Justizgewährleistungsanspruch), which encompasses the right to an effective legal protection in
civil law disputes, including access to court, a generally comprehensive assessment of facts
and law relevant to the case through the judge and a binding verdict.121 The original version
of the KapMuG (2005) did not include the possibility to “register” a claim and thereby suspend its limitation.122 This led to a factual compulsion to join the model procedure, because of
the suction effect described above and the relatively short period of limitation on the
claims.123 It was heavily debated whether this was a constitutional breach of the right to judi-
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cial access.124 The legislator responded to this by introducing the option to register a claim thus suspending this claim’s limitation while not being affected by the binding effect of the
court’s decision in the model proceeding. 125 By consequently weakening the “pooling” of
claims, the German legislator responded to constitutional concerns to the detriment of efficiency in shareholder litigation.
The simplest solution to create an effective pooling of claims would probably be to just create
a US-style “opt-out” model. Considering the constitutional concerns just mentioned however,
this seems utterly out of question in Germany.126
2. Slender Procedure vs. Participation Rights
Other principles in German law are the constitutional right to a fair hearing (rechtliches
Gehör) and the principle of party control (Dispositionsmaxime).127 These rights establish that
the parties can determine themselves what is to be decided by the judge, i.e. they can dispose
over the matter in question,128 and that they have to be heard by the judge.129 In consequence,
all joined parties (basically130) have the same rights (e.g. to plea or present evidence) as the
model plaintiff, pursuant to § 14 KapMuG. This goes fundamentally to the detriment of a
slender and ultimately efficient proceeding. How could the Telekom case then be decided at
all, albeit after almost 10 years? The simple answer is that almost none of the joined parties
had made use of their participation rights.131 Out of the 900 law firms involved on the plaintiffs’ side, only 24 initially showed up personally in court and later only a handful remained.132 If every one of the 900 law firms submitted just one pleading (not even one for
every one of the 17,000 claimants) and only Telekom replied to each of them, the proceeding
would have still dragged on until today.133
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Ultimately there is an unsolvable conflict between fundamental constitutional and procedural
principles in German law on one side and the goal of a having a slender procedure resulting in
efficient litigation.134
E. Conclusion
In short summary, there is a general trend in Europe and Germany in particular towards more
private enforcement, designated as a second track parallel to public enforcement of securities
laws. Because of dispersed damages and rational apathy, a collective redress scheme is a prerequisite for effective private enforcement. In the form of the KapMuG, the German legislator
has tried to create one such with mixed success. Even though the amount of shareholder actions have somewhat increased, the current legal framework does not provide the judiciary
with means to deal with them in a timely fashion. The main deficiencies of the KapMuG
however are rooted in constitutionally guaranteed procedural rights. These rights and principles are not easily abandoned.
The current spirit in Germany is definitely in favor of shareholder litigation. Private law enforcement is increasingly seen as positive and US-style class actions are more and more quoted as positive rather than negative examples. 135 Even creating a definite opt-out model is
openly favored by some.136 History has shown that Germany has always been slow to adapt in
securities supervision and enforcement.137 It might be that in the field of private enforcement
too, Germany just needs more time to adapt and maybe just another push. After over 15 years
of judicial work with the Telekom case, the current VW emissions scandal might just be that
push, as it could become the next severe test for German collective redress in securities litigation. In four years the sun will set on the current version of the KapMuG and at the moment it
seems more than questionable whether it will be deemed ripe for integration into the ZPO.
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Part II – United States of America

A. Chapter introduction
This paper will give an overview of the securities class action (B), go on to show the process
of securities class action (C), and introduce the discussions about the strengths and weaknesses of some of the rationales of the current private enforcement system (D). A brief conclusion
will follow (E).

B. Rule 10b-5 Class Actions in the U.S.: An Overview
In the U.S., average of 189 securities class action claims were filed from 1997 to 2013, and
170 class actions were filed in 2014, according to Cornerstone Research, an economic and
financial concerting firm which tracks securities class action filings.138 Less than 200 cases
each year may not look significant compared to the total civil cases filed each year. But confined to federal class actions, securities class actions take up nearly 50% of cases pending in
the Federal Court of the U.S..139 And 170 class actions in 2014 means that about one in 28
corporations listed on U.S. exchanges was subject to a class action.140 During the period of
1997 and 2007, plaintiffs’ attorneys earned nearly 17 billion dollars in fees from securities
litigation.141 In 2014, when total settlement dollars in securities litigation was the lowest in
16 years, the total amount was still above 1 billion dollars.142 And among those cases, many
actions were based on Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 10b-5.143
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The private right of action based on SEC Rule 10b-5 (“Rule 10b-5”) was not created by the
legislators of the U.S..144 The Congress only rendered conduct unlawful if it was prohibited
by an SEC rule in Section 10(b) of the Security Exchange Act of 1934 (“Section 10(b)”).145
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 which is the catch-all antifraud provision proscribing
fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.146
But Rule 10b-5 also did not explicitly adopt a private right of action, either. Instead, the judiciary, when deciding on defendant’s motion to dismiss on lack of jurisdiction grounds, ruled
that there is an implied right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.147 Since then Rule
10b-5 actions has eventually become a dominant cause of action by use of class action procedure as shown below.
Percentage of complaints of securities class actions cases filed each year which includes
Rule 10b-5 actions148
Year

Percentage

2011

71

2012

85

2013

84

2014

85

Settlements by nature of claims 1996-2014149
Nature of Claim

Number of cases

Section 11 or Section 12 only

83

Both Rule 10b-5 and Section 11 and/or 12(a)(2)

253

Rule 10b-5 only

1,102

All cases since 1996

1,438
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Basic v. Levinson is recognized to have allowed the investor
lawsuits alleging open market fraud for Rule 10b-5 cause of action to be widely used in securities fraud litigation by not rejecting the presumption of reliance, that is the presumption
which most courts of appeals have adopted by the time of the decision.150 The traditional, and
most direct, way a plaintiff may show reliance is by showing that the plaintiff knew about the
company’s statement and bought or sold stock based on that misrepresentation.151 In Basic,
however, the Supreme Court recognized that requiring investors to show direct reliance would
place an unnecessarily unrealistic burden on the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who has traded on an
impersonal market. 152 The Supreme Court observed that requiring individualized reliance
would prevent investors from proceeding with a class action in Rule 10b-5 suits because if
every investor had to prove direct reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentation then individual issues would overwhelm the common ones making class certification inappropriate.153
And the Supreme Court held that it is not inappropriate to apply a rebuttable presumption of
reliance supported by the fraud on the market theory.154

C. Rule 10b-5 Class Action Process
When there is an announcement of correction of a prior representation which follows with a
drastic stock price change, plaintiffs with counsels will typically sue multiple defendants including but not limited to the issuer, CEO and CFO in a class action alleging Rule 10b-5
claim. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), the plaintiff who files
a securities class action complaint must publish notice to other potential class members to
encourage them to step forward within 20 days.155 Within 60 days after the date of the publication, any member of the purported class may move to serve as lead plaintiffs.156 The court
must appoint a lead plaintiff not later than 90 days after the publication of notice.157
When choosing the lead plaintiff, the court should appoint as lead plaintiff the member or
members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be the most capable of
150
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adequately representing the interest of class members.158 It is the chosen lead plaintiff who
select and retain counsel to represent the class subject to the approval of the court.159 Although the PSLRA imposes only the duty to select and retain counsel to the lead plaintiff, the
courts have generally recognized the power of the lead plaintiff to control the overall litigation including discovery, the assertion of legal theories and settlement negotiations.160 Once
the lead plaintiff is appointed, the courts generally allow plaintiffs to file an amended, consolidated class action complaint.161
The Summons and complaint must be served on the defendant within 90 days after the filing
of the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedures (“FRCP”) rule 4.162 When the defendants are served, they may opt for moving to dismiss the cases.163 PSLRA stays discovery
pending any motion to dismiss.164
After the motion to dismiss, the next pivotal moment where the parties collide is the class
certification stage.165 FRCP rule 23(a) allows one or members of a class to sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.166
These requirements for a federal class action apply to Rule 10b-5 class actions seeking monetary relief.167 However, to seek monetary relief the plaintiff also has to meet the requirement
of FRCP rule 23(b)(3). That is, the plaintiffs have to show that (1) questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that (2) a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.168 The party who moves for class certification bears the burden
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to show that each of the FRCP rule 23 prerequisites are satisfied.169 Of these requirements, the
predominance requirement allows the courts to exercise considerable discretion when determining what causes of action are suitable on their facts for class-wide determination.170
In a Rule 10b-5 cause of actions context, elements of FRCP rule 23(a) and superiority requirement of FRCP rule 23(b)(3) are not much of an issue.171 However, much controversy
centered around the predominance requirement.
The Supreme Court has recognized that for cause of action under Rule 10b-5 the plaintiff
must allege and prove 6 elements, that is (1) a material misrepresentation (or omission), (2)
scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind, (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance, (5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation.172 And there are two pivotal stages,
that is class certification stage and the trial stage, where the elements could potentially be
proven. So there are potentially 12 number of cases where each element could be proven.
Of the 6 elements, the Supreme Court decided that reliance requirement is need to be inquired
at the class certification stage in Basic.173 But the debate over the adequacy of the Supreme
Court decision went on until the Supreme Court once again upheld the decision in 2014.174 In
2011, the Supreme Court decided that loss causation need not be proven at class certification
stage.175 And the Supreme Court ruled that materiality requirement need not be proven at
class certification stage in 2013.176 The decision on class certification may be appealed subject to the discretion of the court.177
Not many securities class action cases actually go to trial. Only 21 have gone to trial and only
15 have reached a verdict or judgment out of 4,435 securities class actions that were filed between the enactment of PSLRA and December 31th, 2014.178 Another study found that out of
securities claim cases seeking damages from 1980 to 2005, only 37 cases that were tried to
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judgment against public companies, their officers and directors, or both.179 Most cases that are
not dismissed are settled. The cases may settle any time during the procedure. About 40% of
the securities class actions including Rule 10b-5 class action are settled while there is still a
possibility of dismissal.180 Because settlements made as a class binds other class members
who are absent, FRCP 23(e) requires court approval as a safeguard against abuse.181
Settlement procedure consists of three phases: (1) the preliminary approval hearing; (2) the
notice period; and (3) the final approval and fairness hearing.182 When the parties have agreed
to the terms of the settlement, they must move the court for preliminary approval.183 The court
reviews whether (1) the proposed class is suitable for final certification under the Federal
Rules; and (2) the substantive and procedural terms of the settlement are fair, reasonable, and
adequate.184 When the court gives a preliminary approval, the parties should then notify proposed class members of the settlement.185 After the notice is served, the court will conduct a
final approval hearing and determine whether to finally approve the settlement.186
It is possible to opt out of a class action in class actions seeking money damages.187 If a party
opts out of a securities class action, the party is not bound by the class action.188 Study shows
that in cases where there were parties who opted out to sue individually, the opted out parties
have done better than the they would have if they have not opted out and settled as a class.189
Opting out is possible even at the class action settlement stage by the court’s discretion.190
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In Rule 10b-5 action, the plaintiff commonly name both the company and the potentially responsible executives and directors as defendants.191 However, the Supreme Court of United
States have been criticized as narrowing the scope of defendants over the years.192 In Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., the Supreme Court concluded
that there is no private aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b), which means that
there is no cause of action for aider and abettors in a Rule 10b(5) action.193 And in Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Supreme Court when addressing
whether two third-party participants in a fraudulent scheme, engineered by a corporate issuer,
faced liability in a private securities lawsuit for harm caused by the issuer's false and misleading corporate disclosures, decided that there is no reliance, and hence no liability, when the
link between the third party's actions and the resulting misrepresentation by the issuer is too
remote or attenuated.194 Then again, In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,
the Supreme Court held that a mutual fund investment advisor can not be held liable for Rule
10b-5 private action for misrepresentation in the prospectuses of the mutual fund because it
did not make a misrepresentation within the meaning of Rule 10b-5.195
D. Analysis
Rule 10b-5 class action may serve multiple purposes. It may (1) serve to compensate fraud
victims, (2) operate as a deterrent against future fraud, or/and (3) work as a corporate governance mechanism. But there are different views on whether the class action is working effectively to serve these purposes which we will look into below.

I. Compensation Rationale
Rule 10b-5 class action is criticized for not being an adequate tool to compensate the victims
for various reasons. First of all, it is criticized that the private litigation is performing poorly
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to compensate the victims.196 Study shows that the median recovery rate for class actions does
not exceed 7.2% of the estimated investor loss.197 Although it is hard to calculate the damages
caused by the revelation of the misrepresentation which can be connected to the misrepresentation itself,198 the difference between the estimated investor loss and the median recovery
rate does seem substantial. Another study shows that approximately 96% of securities class
action settlements fell within the insurance coverage. 199 The finding that the settlement
amounts are almost always covered by whatever insurance coverage that a corporation may
have at the moment could show that the settlement amount may not be an adequate compensation for investor loss.
Moreover, the fact that most of the Rule 10b-5 class actions settle in the U.S. has further implications. When securities class actions settle, most of the cases are settled with the insurance
companies paying all or most of the settlement.200 And even for the cases where insurance
companies not paying all the settlement payments, corporations seem to pay the settlement
payments mostly.201 This practice undermines the rationale for compensating the plaintiffs in
Rule 10b-5 class actions for reasons below.
Many shareholders who is a class of plaintiff in a Rule 10b-5 class action may hold shares of
the corporation named defendant.202 That is because the shareholder may have bought and
sold the share at different times.203 Moreover, many modern investors hold stocks in portfolios.204 Because these investors can be expected to sometimes benefit when the misrepresentation distorts the price by selling in a high price, while sometimes be harmed when the misrepresentation distorts the price by selling in a low price, thus their gain and losses will net out
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over time as their diversified status.205 Assuming that investors are repeat players, the benefits
and harms will mostly cancel each other out.206 This may also be true to uninformed traders
who buy and sell stocks randomly without informational basis.207 In these instances, the litigation fee including those paid to the attorneys will be extra cost suffered for a benefit which
has been already accomplished by diversification.208
However, this may not be the case for retail investors who buy and hold the stocks for a long
time.209 Since in the U.S., Rule 10b-5 class action is actionable to those who have bought or
sold the stocks, someone who holds on to the stock without trading for a long time will not
have standing to sue.210 They will be systematically compensating for the plaintiffs in the
class action unless they may be compensated in other ways.211 As we will see below, they will
not be compensated because of the settlement practice.
Another group of people who are not holding their stocks in portfolio are informed investors.212 The informed trader who instead of diversifying incur cost of research to profit from
acting on the information by trading are more likely to suffer net losses from securities fraud
precisely because they trade on information, including fraudulent information.213 For these
kind of traders, compensation is both desirable and noncircular.214
This problem mainly occurs because the defendant contributing for the damages of the plaintiffs are the corporation by paying the premium to the insurance company and actually paying
the damages out of corporate assets.215 If the directors and/or officers who actually made the
misrepresentation or the aiders and abettors of the misrepresentation such as lawyers are the
ones who are paying for the damages to the plaintiffs, then there will be no pocket shifting to
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the portfolio holders and no systemic loss to the long term holders.216 However, as the rule
and practice stands in the U.S., the criticisms that Rule 10b-5 class actions is not adequately
compensating the victims are not entirely without merits.217

II. Deterrence Rationale
It is further argued that private litigation also has a role in deterring misrepresentation.218 This
rationales is independent from the compensation rationale in the sense that the success or failure of one does not depend upon the other.219 Corporate fraud may cause reduced management accountability, a loss of liquidity in the stock market and distorted capital allocation.220
Private litigation serves as a deterrence mechanism in which the plaintiff or plaintiff’s lawyer
works as a private attorney general who punishes corporations for its prohibited behavior.221
Deterrence works when a prospective wrongdoer decides not to do the wrongful act knowing
that he or she will be forced to pay the full cost of any harm he or she causes.222 Number of
offenses one would commit would be a function of probability of conviction per offense, punishment per offense and other variables.223 An increase in probability of conviction or punishment per offense would tend to reduce the number of offenses because in either case the
probability of paying the higher price or the price itself would increase.224 In securities class
action context, it may work as an mechanism which could increase both the probability of
finding the misrepresentation or increasing the price to pay for making such a misrepresentation.225 However, it is criticized as not being an efficient mechanism for reasons below.
According to a study about who detects fraud consisting of 216 cases of alleged corporate
frauds which include all of the high-profile cases such as Enron, HealthSouth, and Worldcom,
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there were only 3% of the cases where the detection of the fraud was attributable to private
litigation.226 This contrasts with the finding in the study where the key role in fraud detection
is made by employees who is the detector in 17% of the cases and the media which can be
accountable for 13% of the cases.227 While the study may not show whether or not we need
private litigation to detect the 3% of cases to reach the optimal level of detection, it does show
that private litigation does not take up the bulk of the work in detecting corporate fraud.228
Another mechanism where private litigation may have a role in detecting fraud is by enhancing transparency. That is, if private litigation adds more transparency to corporate information, it may help deter fraud. But there are mixed findings on whether private litigation
adds more transparency to corporate conducts or not, especially regards to voluntary disclosures.229
Private enforcement could increase the price of payment of the misrepresentation after the
fraud was detected. But this mechanism is undermined by the usage of director and officer
(“D&O”) insurance. When a payment is made by the corporation, it would mean that the the
stockholders of the corporation as a residual owner is making the ultimate payment.230 And
because the corporation usually pays the premium for the D&O insurance, the payment made
by the D&O insurance is also born by the shareholder of the corporation as a premium paid
by the corporation.231
D&O insurance as commonly provided consist of 3 distinct insurance arrangement.232 They
are (1) coverage to protect individual managers from the risk of shareholder litigation in the
event that the corporation is unable to indemnify them, (2) coverage to reimburse the corporation for its indemnification obligations, and (3) coverage to protect the corporation from the
226
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risk of shareholder litigation to which the corporate entity itself is a party.233 The part of coverage which insures individual directors and officers usually include compensatory damages,
settlement amounts, and defense costs incurred by the individual director or officer in his or
her official capacity.234 When corporation incurs an obligation to indemnify its officers or
directors which most policies deem to be required in every case in which a corporation is legally permitted to do so, the insurer will reimburse the company pursuant to the terms of the
indemnification obligation.235 For the cases where the liabilities arising directly against the
corporation as a defendant in shareholder litigation, D&O insurance also included coverage to
protect the corporation itself as a party.236 While most D&O insurance payment is made under
coverage (2), (3) which is technically a coverage for the corporation, the insurance package as
a whole works for the benefit of the directors and officers.237
This doesn’t mean that the managers will always settle for their own good at the expense of
the corporation. The managers may have incentive to settle for the benefit of the corporation.
Considering American rule where prevailing party are not entitled to get reimbursement of the
incurred legal fees and expense from the opposing party combined with the cost of discovery,
the defendants will generally find settlement cheaper than litigation.238 Litigation costs for the
defendants can be high because in a discovery process the plaintiff can control the discovery
agenda which the defendants are obliged to respond unless they can persuade the court that
the request is improper.239 The plaintiff’s attorney, knowing that the American rule prevents
fee shifting will impose costs on the adversary while economizing its own cost.240
One could argue that as long as the D&O insurers companies work to prevent and manage the
corporation, the usage of D&O insurance works as a deterrence.241 However, study suggests
that insurance companies do not provide loss prevention services regarding corporate fraud.242
As long as the actual wrong doers are not actually paying for the settlement amount of the
securities class action, enforcement by private litigation may not have the asserted deterrence
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effect of increasing the price of misrepresentation.243 On the other hand, increasing the cost of
making representation could potentially could cause excessive precaution cost.244
The deterrence effect may still function indirectly if the outside professionals functioning as
gatekeepers of corporate frauds are affected by the securities litigation.245 When a corporation
makes a public statement, outside professionals could be efficient gatekeepers because they
can access the corporation’s inside information when providing necessary service for making
such a statement.246 These professionals may not have the proper incentive to perform the
gatekeeping function because they have incentives to maintain a relationship with the corporation.247 But because the supreme court of the U.S. have have kept on removing the liability
of the outside professionals as seen above, gatekeepers may not have sufficient incentives to
deter corporate fraud.248

III. Corporate Governance Rationale
The justification of private litigation may not only be grounded on investor protection but also
on enhancement of corporate governance.249 One rationale is that by making the shareholders
pay for the corporate fraud of the managers, the securities class action creates responsibility
and incentives to monitor the acts of the managers.250 This rationale is not without merits.
However, considering the given power of the shareholders in U.S. corporate governance system, shareholders may not have the power to monitor the acts of the managers.251 That is,
shareholders may not be innocent, but they may be helpless.252
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Another rationale for shareholder litigation is that it may enhance the quality of the disclosure
which plays a role in corporate governance.253 Not only will better informed shareholder monitor the managers better, but the allows the market mechanism like market for corporate control to work more efficiently.254 But whether securities class action as currently practiced has
sufficient deterrence effect on managers to improve their quality of disclosure is debatable for
the reasons seen above. Moreover, although the corporation will have to disclose information
that are mandatory, risk of liability could increase incentives to reduce the amount of voluntary disclosure.255 So the over all effect of the securities class action on the disclosure system
seems unclear.
But shareholder litigation as a compensation mechanism may add more justification to the
shareholder litigation as a corporate governance mechanism.256 This rationale involves the
role of informed traders. Informed traders make costly investments to research for firmspecific information which could include fraudulent information.257 Because informed traders
are trading based on information, their gains and losses from securities fraud are unlikely to
cancel each other out.258 As these informed traders promote capital market efficiency which
will enhance corporate governance, allowing informed traders to recover their damages from
fraudulent information could be justified.259 This compensation rationale, while persuasive as
a justification for allowing private enforcement, could also lead to a possible demand for
modification in U.S. securities class action.260 Because fraud on the market theory as decided
by the U.S. Supreme court allows not only who relied on the information to recover but also
allows those who only relied on the market price to recover as well.261
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E. Conclusion
Securities class action is supposed to do a lot of work in the U.S. It is expected to compensate,
effectively deter misrepresentations, or/and work as a mechanism to enhance corporate governance. However, private litigation as currently practiced in the U.S. are subject to much
criticism. Whether it should be reformed to better serve its objectives or be eliminated will
have to be considered not just by itself, but also with public enforcement mechanism which
tries to address similar objectives by different approach.262
Even up against much criticism, it is true that private enforcement of the U.S. is unique in the
sense that it is not something that is left in the book, but something that is in operation.263 So
when searching for optimal enforcement mechanism to meet the objectives of securities law,
whether they are compensation, deterrence, or/and enhancing corporate governance, the rich
experience of the U.S. private enforcement history should be taken into consideration.
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Part III - Comparison

A. Chapter Introduction
As has been shown, private litigation and collective redress is an issue both in the U. S. and in
Germany. On the basis of Part I and Part II, the following will try to draw some comparisons
between the legal frameworks followed by considering possible obstacles of importing U.S.
style class action to Germany. Then, we will consider some German legal framework which
may be used in the U.S. to improve the U.S. securities class action system. Finally, we will
consider the impact that securities law and D&O insurance practice in Germany might have
on addressing deterrence objectives in Germany under the assumption of active enforcement,
which will be followed by a brief conclusion.

B. Comparison between US and Germany
The comparison will focus first on a more general level (I.). Next, the incentives of the parties
to use collective redress will be addressed (II.). Following this, the possibility of importing
U.S. style class action to Germany and potential obstacles hereto will be discussed (III.),
which will follow with a conclusion (IV.).

I. General Observations
Taking a broad look at Part I and Part II above, one cannot help but notice some more general
differences between Germany and the U.S. Main differences exist in the areas of enforcement
mechanisms, the extent of shareholder actions and the topics of legal discussion.

1. Private vs. Public Enforcement
Corporate behavior can be externally controlled by enforcing disclosure duties.264 This enforcement can happen in two distinct ways, i.e. by public or private means.265
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Germany has historically been favoring public enforcement, through the BaFin, the States and
the Public Exchanges.266 Private enforcement is only recently becoming more popular and
being adopted on a statutory basis.267
This marks a contrast to the situation in the U.S., where the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the supplementary role of private enforcement to public enforcement as early as
1964.268 U.S. procedural law allows class action lawsuits for most areas of substantial law,
including (but in no way limited to) securities fraud disputes.269
These different approaches to the enforcement of regulations can be explicitly seen in the
field of securities law, when contrasting the extent of private litigation in both countries.

2. Extent of Private Litigation in Securities Markets
When looking at the actual numbers of private shareholder actions for securities fraud there is
a stark contrast between Germany and the U.S. In Germany there was a total of only 111
court decisions concerning securities fraud action based on §§ 37b, c WpHG (the predominant
statutory basis for misrepresentation suits) from 2001 to 2013.270 This is less than the yearly
average of securities class action lawsuits being filed in the U.S. - a number that does not
even come close to the total number of securities disputes.271
These differences in factual circumstances are an explanation for the third area of contrast
between Germany and the U.S. - the focus of legal discussion.

3. Topics of Legal Discussion
As we have seen, many securities class actions are being filed in the U.S. every year, and
most of them are filed with Rule 10b-5 cause of action.272 But because Rule 10b-5 cause of
action is implied not explicit, lots of issues regarding both substantive law and procedural law
had to be cleared up by the judiciary as the Congress did not design the overall elements and
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procedures. 273 And because of the volume of filings, the U.S. Supreme Court had many
chances to frame the structure of the implied cause of action.274
Germany on the other hand is - provocatively speaking - still “a step behind” concerning matters of private enforcement and substantial law. A system of collective redress in the form of
the KapMuG has only recently been established for securities market disputes.275 The KapMuG and its underlying aspects of procedural law are still hotly debated and the focus is not
as much on substantial law.276 The most relevant topic of legal discussion is how a collective
redress scheme in Germany should look like. One possibility - importing US-style securities
class action - will be discussed in further detail below.

II. Incentives to Use Collective Redress
One question that deserves further elaboration is: What are the incentives to use collective
redress in both countries? For a system of collective redress in securities disputes to work and
be actually used, it should address the incentive of the party expected to use the procedure.

1. General Observations
The mechanism of collective redress can be designed in various ways. It can be structured
either as an opt-in system (as which the German KapMuG is basically designed) or as an optout system as in the case of U.S. class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedures
(FRCP) Rule 23.
Another basic differentiation can be made concerning the scope of the court’s decision. In a
German KapMuG procedure the court only decides on certain elements, while in the U.S. the
court decides on the claim in its entirety.277
However, it is interesting to note that although much focus is on the U.S. class action with
opt-out system and monetary claims, the U.S. has other kinds of class actions, too. For instance, FRCP Rule 23(d) allows opt-out class certification on partial issues, although this pro-
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cedure is only used infrequently.278 Moreover, U.S. statutes like Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Equal Pay Act (EPA) also
have opt-in class actions for certain kinds of actions.279

2. Incentives on Plaintiffs’ Side
In the case of FRCP Rule 23 securities class action in the U.S., the incentive to make use of
class action procedure seems to be mainly on the plaintiffs’ side. One reason is the existence
of mandatory court awarded fees for the plaintiffs’ counsel.280 This is more of an incentive for
the attorney or attorneys who represent the filing plaintiff rather than the individual plaintiffs.281 If the counsel succeeds in obtaining a certification of a class (of which the aggregated
amount of all claims is sufficiently high), the counsel can expect to be awarded a considerable
sum when the case settle.282
The American Rule regarding litigation fee could also be considered to favor the plaintiff.283
In the U.S., each side pays for its own litigation fees regardless of the outcome in a securities
class action.284 Consequently the plaintiff does not have to take the possibility of paying for
the inevitably incurred legal fees of the defendant in the event of losing the case into account
when considering whether to file a claim or not.285 In practice, the plaintiff’s counsel will
agree to represent the plaintiff in a class action, expecting court awarded remuneration when
the case concludes.286
This is not the case for Germany. The KapMuG is designed in a way that resembles an opt-in
system (although it technically is something unique that cannot be classified as purely optin).287 The aggregation effect of an opt-in system is far weaker than the opt-out system.288
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Moreover, not only does the KapMuG not allow court-awarded fees contingent on the amount
of the plaintiffs’ recovery, but contingent fee contracts are (generally) not allowed in Germany.289 So there is not much incentive for the plaintiffs’ attorneys to file for a KapMuG intermediate proceeding.
However, there may still be some incentive for the plaintiff to file for a KapMuG proceeding.
In a KapMuG action, the court fee for each individual trial has to be paid when initially filing
a claim and there is no extra fee when the case progresses to the model case procedure.290 The
additional costs incurred during the model case procedure (e.g. expert expenses) are added to
the total costs in the individual trials in proportion to the amount of each plaintiff's claim in
the end.291 The plaintiffs do not have to pay the advance in costs for the expert expenses in the
model case proceeding.292 This is quite different from the usual procedure, where the party
making the motion is required to pay the advance in costs for the expenses of gathering evidence, including the expenses of the expert appointed by the court.293 That means in a case
where the expert expenses are high, the party with the burden to prove an element requiring
high expenses (which will usually be the plaintiff) has an incentive to request a model procedure. The loser of the case has to reimburse these costs at the end of the individual proceeding.294 Because the litigation costs incurred during the model case procedure (including expert
expenses) would have incurred even if the case was brought individually, the overall expected
cost of litigation may be lower compared to the expected cost of an individual proceeding. In
a KapMuG procedure, the expert expenses are distributed between all plaintiffs and each
plaintiff has the duty to reimburse only when one loses.295
When we look deeper in the KapMuG procedure, we should note that are two decisions to be
made by all injured shareholders. The first decision is whether to file a securities fraud action
at all or not, and the second decision is whether to request a KapMuG procedure or not. The
first decision may be crucially influenced by the existence of the KapMuG for a plaintiff who
does not have the money for the advance in costs for expert fees. This plaintiff will have more
incentive to request a KapMuG procedure because such a plaintiff would probably be judg288
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ment proof anyway if the party loses in the final outcome.296 However, a party who has the
resources to pay for the procedure, even if the outcome is a loss, only has the money value of
the time for expert fee which has not been prepaid in the KapMuG procedure. This in turn
should be weighed against the resources spent by the extra time the KapMuG procedure may
have incurred.
The other mechanism, which allows proportionate distribution of the expense among the losers, will be an advantage which can be exploited indifferently by all parties. However, this is
an incentive which is modest at best, as it only lowers the legal cost of the party, not the legal
attorney. So this mechanism will not be likely to bring about the entrepreneurship mindset of
a plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel in Germany, unlike the U.S. securities class action does in the
U.S..297
Some attention should also be brought to the incentives on the side of plaintiffs’ counsels.
Usually, there is no extra payment for the plaintiff’s counsel when a case goes on to KapMuG
intermediate proceeding in principle.298 So requesting the use of KapMuG procedure may not
be welcome to the plaintiff’s counsel unless the counsel happens to be representing many
plaintiffs with similar claims which cannot be joined together by other procedure.299

3. Incentives on Defendants’ Side
Will there be an incentive on the defendant’s side? Because settling an opt-out class action in
the U.S. will make the dispute be settled for good (except for some individual plaintiffs who
choose to opt out) without risking the cost of high litigation, there may be an incentive for the
defendant to use an opt-out class action in theory. 300 However, defendants will generally
move to dismiss the case because PSLRA stays discovery pending any motion to dismiss.301
It could be said that there is also some incentive to the defendant of Germany to opt for class
action in KapMuG, because in a KapMuG procedure the issue is only a certain element of a
claim which is fatal for the plaintiffs’ case, while the defendant may still go on disputing
296
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plaintiffs’ claims in other grounds. 302 However, usually it is the plaintiff who moves for
KapMuG procedure in practice.303 A possible explanation for this phenomenon could be that
the defendants are seeking tactical advantages by trying each case individually.304

4. Incentives on Courts’ Side
Lastly, the incentives on the courts’ side should be considered. In the U.S., because the petition for certifying class action is filed with the filing of the complaint.305 So, it is hard for the
court to voice their opinion about the petition of class certification before the petition has
been filed in an individual case. However, the Supreme Court has been narrowing the scope
of Rule 10b-5 private right of action which could in theory deter those kind of actions from
being filed.306 But statistics show that securities class actions filings have been quite steady
over the years.307
In Germany, if the court has decided that there will be a KapMuG intermediate proceeding,
then all individual trials that are dependent on issues of the model procedure are suspended,
regardless of whether the individual plaintiff opted in by filing a motion of request.308 Even
those cases that are filed after the decision to proceed by the KapMuG procedure will be immediately suspended.309 This effect will lower the workload of the court very much which is
one of the reasons the KapMuG has been legislated in the first place.310 It may even be that
the court could be willing to advise the plaintiff to file a request to use a KapMuG procedure,
when the court estimates that there will be too many individual filings of action. This is an
empirical question which the answer could be partially found by seeing at what point the request is filed by the plaintiff. KapMuG procedure goes into intermediate proceeding only if
ten or more plaintiffs make a request for KapMuG procedure within six months of the first
motion. If the plaintiffs start to file requests for KapMuG procedure only after 10 or more
plaintiffs have individually filed a securities fraud action, this may be an indication that the
court has urged the plaintiff to do so.
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Opt-in class actions may be filed when the stakes are high enough. In the U.S., FLSA wage
claims often generate an amount in controversy in excess of five million dollars which could
attract the plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ attorneys to file for opt-in class action.311 In the Telekomcase in Germany, there was a flood of securities fraud actions being filed even before the introduction of the KapMuG. The average individual claim was about 5,900 EUR, which is an
amount that is high enough to overcome the effects of “rational apathy” and move shareholders to sue even without a class action procedure in Germany.312

C. Importing US Class Action to Germany?
Assuming that U.S. opt-out class action system is needed for Germany, what are the obstacles
for its implementation? There may be obstacles of political, legal and practical nature.

I. Political Obstacles
First of all, some consideration should be given to the political obstacles which would likely
be encountered. As has been discussed, most securities class actions settle in the U.S. with the
insurance companies paying all or most of the settlement payments because of D&O insurance.313 In the cases where for some reason D&O insurances are not enough to cover the cost,
the corporations mostly pay the settlement payments themselves.314 When corporations make
payments to plaintiffs, the shareholders - who are the residual owners of the corporation - are
essentially paying the price.315 Moreover, in the U.S. corporation buy the D&O insurance for
their officers and directors,316 so the D&O insurance premiums are also in essence paid by the
shareholders.317 Because of this mechanism, certain players of the capital market could actively resist any legal change that might result in more active private enforcement. These players
311
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could namely be (1) institutional investors, (2) long term investors, (3) controlling shareholders and even (4) the German government.

1. Institutional Investors
Many institutional investors who hold stocks in portfolios could object to class actions because they will potentially lose money due to the circularity problem.318 These investors who
are not looking for private benefit or control may on the one hand be rationally reticent to
engage in firm specific corporate issues for various reasons.319 Implementation of U.S. type
class action system to Germany however may affect all listed corporation. For this reason,
institutional investors as a whole may become more proactive and object to the implementation of U.S. style securities class action.

2. Long-Term Investors
More clear losers of the active enforcement through class actions could be the long term
shareholders who do not hold stock in portfolios. For instance, there are employees, managers, or other small investors who buy and hold stocks for a long time for retirement.320
In the U.S., only the party who has bought or sold the stock have standing to sue.321 In Germany too, there has to be some kind of transaction during the time period of misinformation.322 Because of this reason, long term shareholders will most often be the ones who in
the end will pay the price, as they will not have traded during the period at issue.323
With the above in mind, the long term shareholders in Germany will most likely resist change
to the current low private enforcement levels and some may have enough political influences
to succeed in blocking any attempt to incorporate the U.S. style opt-out class action.
318
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3. Controlling Shareholders
Specific types of long term shareholders are the controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders will typically be holding on to shares for a long time, neither buying nor selling.324
Considering the above, controlling shareholders who have large stakes as direct shareholders
of a corporation, will pay the highest price. Moreover, because controlling shareholders hold a
lot of stock in specific corporations, they will not be rationally apathetic. Although controlling
stockholders may hold other corporations’ stocks in an attempt to diversify, it will be difficult
to fully diversify away all firm specific risks, while holding controlling blocks of publicly
traded corporations. So at least some of them may not want the U.S. class action type enforcement.325
In the U.S., it may no longer be accurate to say that investors are dispersed.326 However, the
percentage of public corporations with controlling shareholders is quite low, approximately
less than 10 percent.327
There are more corporations with controlling shareholders in Germany.328 The general influence of dispersed-ownership stockholders is relatively low and is only slowly increasing.329
As of 2008, only 7% of the Germans hold shares as private individuals, while in comparison,
50% of all households in the U.S. do. 330 There is a trend from more concentration to less concerning shareholder compositions, with less and less interdependencies.331 It is however still
safe to assume that due to the still existing entanglements in ownership, a powerfully large
324
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part of the business world would heavily oppose an introduction of U.S. securities class actions due to the fear of falling prey to the mechanism described above.

4. Government as controlling shareholder
Another possible influential player with economic interest in the public stock market is the
government. In the U.S., there was no government controlled corporation incorporated under
state law which traded in the public market before 2008.332 This does not mean that there
were no government controlled corporations in the U.S. history. The U.S. government have
frequently chartered wholly owned corporation in the past, and some public traded business
entities have special provisions in the charter giving some kind of control to the U.S. government.333 It just means that there is not much history of U.S. government ownership of publicly
trading corporation in private industry.334
This is not the case in Germany. Although there are not too many government involvements
in publicly traded companies, German public authorities do hold stock in a few major ones,
for example: Fraport AG (51.35%),335 Deutsche Telekom AG (31.7%),336 Deutsche Post AG
(21%),337 Volkswagen AG (20%),338 and Commerzbank AG (17.15%).339 As these participations are all long term, the Government could potentially be negatively affected by the mechanism described above.340
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Yet even though the German Government may stand on the defendants’ side systematically,
consequently losing more due to a higher level of private enforcement through securities class
actions, it would be a long shot to assert that this would be an (official) reason as to why the
government resists the introduction of a U.S. style class action. After all, it was the German
government’s declared goal to increase the level of private enforcement.341

II. Legal Obstacles
In addition to the possible political obstacles described above, there are a few potential legal
obstacles too.

1. Filing Fee
In the U.S., the filing fee for a class action in federal court is flat, currently at 350 dollars.342
Relative to the amount at stake in a class action, the filing fee that the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s counsel has to bear is nominal.343
In contrast, the filing fee for a claim in Germany is calculated by a formula that is a function
of the amount at stake and the calculated fee has to be filed up front.344 If the amount at stake
is calculated by not only the amount at stake for the plaintiff but the amount as a class, then it
will not be economically feasible for a plaintiff to pay the filing fee of a class action.345
However, this effect could be circumvented by introducing a flat filing fee for securities class
actions in Germany. Although it is the norm in Germany that the filing fee is calculated based
on the amount of the claim,346 there are already exceptions to this rule, i.e. flat fees for certain
procedures.347 So it may be possible to make another exception to the rule. Another possibility
would be capping the filing fee to the alleged damages of the lead plaintiff.348 Lastly, a system
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could be introduced where a plaintiff files a claim first with the normal fees subsequently allowing request class certification with an additional flat fee. Each of these mechanism may
allow the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s counsel to file a class action without having to carry the
filing fees of other plaintiffs.

2. Fee Shifting Rule
Each party pays for its own legal fees regardless of the outcome in the U.S. in contrast to
Germany, where the loser pays for the winners cost in principle.349 Although the German fee
shifting or “loser pays” rule may seem like an obstacle, it is not a high hurdle. When cases
settle, each party pays for its own fees incurred until the time of the settlement unless party
agree to a different arrangement.350 In addition to this, there is a cap on how much legal fees
can be charged to the other party, i.e. only the “standard statutory fees” for attorneys can be
shifted.351 The standard statutory fees are calculated with the help of the German Lawyer’s
Remuneration Act (RVG) and are also (as a general rule) based on the amount at stake.352 In
most cases however the lawyer will insist on working not on a static fee basis, but on hourly
rates. Such agreements are possible pursuant to § 3a RVG and will most of the times exceed
the statutory fees. The excess however will not be reimbursed under the loser pays rule.353 It
means a plaintiff (or plaintiff’s counsel) that loses does not have to bear all of defendants’
legal fees. Moreover, the plaintiff can roughly estimate the amount of lawyer fees the plaintiff
will have to reimburse to the defendant in case of a loss when deciding whether to sue.354
However, it should be noted that there has to be some kind of a rule on calculating the amount
at stake in a class action as it will be very difficult to make a calculation for the amount at
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stake for the whole class. If the amount at stake is calculated by the amount at stake for the
lead plaintiff, which will be very small compared to the amount at stake as a class, then the
fee shifting rule will not make much difference because the actual amount to be reimbursed
will not be high.

3. Contingent fee
As we have seen, judge awarded fees to the plaintiffs’ counsel allow the counsel to represent
plaintiffs on a contingent fee basis.355 This works as a factor for the plaintiff’s counsel to be
an entrepreneur in the U.S..356 However, this is not the case in Germany. In Germany, contingent fees are generally not allowed.357 The total ban has been somewhat alleviated in 2006 by
the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, which held that a flat-out ban on contingent
fees is unconstitutional.358 Today, contingent fees are allowed in Germany, but only in a very
limited scope, namely if no other funding is available for the plaintiff.359 This may potentially
be a starting point for further reform. Germany could decide to allow contingent fee contracts
(up to a limited amount) in the specific case of securities fraud actions.

4. Lack of Discovery Process
In the U.S., discovery is a major part of civil litigation which allows private enforcement.360
But because Germany does not have a discovery system, it may be harder for the plaintiff to
prove certain elements like scienter. However, this obstacle may be overcome by either (1)
creating procedural rules to shift the burden of proof for certain elements like scienter to the
defendant, or (2) getting rid of certain elements like scienter. This could leave elements that
may be proven by evidence that is not closely guarded by the defendant.
The German answer to the lack of a discovery stage in procedural law is mostly shifting the
355
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burden of proof in favor of the party that would have difficulties proving a certain element in
front of the court. However, it should be kept in mind that shifting the burden of proof might
not have the same effectiveness as a discovery system. The defendant can in turn shift back
by producing only evidence that is favorable for his position.361 This again leaves the plaintiff
blindsided, because in Germany there is no sanction for failing to reveal information (other
than potentially losing the case).362 However, in the U.S., a party that refuses to disclose information during the discovery phase may be heavily sanctioned, including the plaintiff’s attorney or even the entire law firm.363 Lack of a discovery procedure thus can be a crucial obstacle against effective securities litigation in Germany.

5. Lack of Civil Juries
Fact finding decisions made by civil juries are generally more unpredictable compared to the
decisions of professional judges.364 Moreover, juries may be more favorable to investors alleging loss than to public corporation.365 So there could be more incentives to initiate a securities class action when civil juries are provided.366 While there are civil juries in the U.S., there
are no civil juries in Germany.
Yet because civil juries may make decisions that are generally more in favor of investors, this
might incentivize meritless suits and open up securities fraud actions for abuse.367 Considering this, the lack of civil juries should not be considered an obstacle for introducing class action in Germany in general, but rather as deterrence for meritless suits.

6. Constitutional constraints
As has been shown in full detail in Part I of this paper, the general idea of collective redress
systems such as the class action face major constitutional constraints. A real bundling of cases
through a class action can only be achieved to the detriment of the fundamental principles of
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party control and the right to judicial access in German procedural law.368 As long as there is
no movement away from these principles, this is perhaps the most relevant obstacle against an
import of US class action to Germany.369

III. Practical Obstacles - Proving Elements Using Expert Opinion
Generally, a plaintiff should allege and prove certain elements which could include reliance,
loss causation and damages to the plaintiff for the plaintiff to prevail in a misrepresentation
action. In a securities litigation context, the plaintiff would resort to expert witness to prove
these elements.370
In the U.S., it is the practice that each party hires its own experts.371 Although there is a rule
which allows the court to hire its own expert, most judges are reluctant to use that power.372
So in the U.S., each party knows that there will be at least some experts who are willing to
testify for its cause as long as there is some credibility to the expert and the case has some
merits. On the other hand, each party knows that there will probably be two differing opinions
of experts which is itself a risk. This risk may be a factor which incentivizes the parties to
settle.
However, this is not the case for Germany. Usually, German Courts appoint their own expert
who will submit a written report of its findings with relevant opinions. 373 The court will
choose the expert from lists kept by the professional bodies, or a person known form the
court’s past experience to be a reliable expert in the case where there is no such list.374 So the
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parties have far less control over the expert who is appointed. Even if the party appoints an
expert for itself, the expert will not be taken as impartial.375
Although the cost of an expert hired by the party is also subject to the loser pays rule if the
hiring of the expert is necessary,376 this is generally not the case.377
For the reasons above, the plaintiff in Germany cannot provide a favorable expert witness
with a reasonable certainty compared to the plaintiff in the U.S., so it is riskier for the plaintiff
or plaintiff’s counsel to sue as a class action in Germany. This practice might also deter the
plaintiff or the plaintiff’s counsel from deciding to sue for class action.
It should be further noted that because of the current practice of using financial technics as
event studies is very important in the U.S. style class action,378 and because experts have
some discretion over choices such as defining announcement date or considering the length of
the announcement period,379 loss of control over experts is also a risk to the parties because
each party may not know how the expert chosen by the court will decide on such factors.
However, it could be argued that the German practice in expert evidence would just work as
deterrence to meritless suits, because a favorable decision for a party cannot be “bought” by
hiring a specific expert. The court appointed experts will be far more independent and thus be
committed to the truth.
It should be noted that the German system allows for the parties to ask opinions of the expert
chosen by the court, so the parties do have access to the expert (although limited compared to
the U.S.) even if the expert is chosen by the court.380
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IV. Conclusion
There are many differences between Germany and the U.S. which would not allow U.S. style
class actions to be incorporated to function as in the U.S. However, it is hard to know how
much each of these differences affects the likelihood of a successful implementation. Some or
all of the factors may work together as an obstacle, or certain difference in system may be the
crucial hurdle. Finding the optimal mechanism may be an empirical question to which an answer could be found by comparing the situation in other and different legal regimes. Different
countries may have different sets of mechanisms with different results.381 However, by identifying those differences, one could find solutions which may be different as to the form but
similar as to the function.

D. Enhancing the US Securities Class Action System
Some mechanisms found in Germany may serve to reform the current class action system in
the U.S. In this part, we will discuss some mechanisms of Germany, which could be considered in the U.S. context.

I. Civil Juries
As have seen above, civil juries may incentivize meritless suits and open up opportunities to
abuse securities fraud actions.382 Because defendants may predict decisions made by judges
somewhat more accurately compared to decisions made by civil juries, the defendants may
have less pressure to settle without civil juries.383 Moreover, jurors may be less capable at
understanding statistical evidences.384 As we have seen above not many securities class action
actually go to trial,385 so the chance of an individual juror to actually experience statistical
evidence is very low. Judges, on the other hand, are more likely to be more comfortable with
381
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statistical evidence, not only because judges are more likely to be a repeat players of securities class action but also because statistical evidence such as event study is used at the early
stage of the litigation process.386 For these reasons, the U.S. securities class action might improve if civil juries are replaced with professional judges.387

II. Fee Shifting Rule
As we have seen, the loser pays in Germany.388 While this rule may work as a hurdle for the
plaintiff to aggressively file a class action, it also may have certain merits when compared to
the American rule. For instance, the plaintiff may try to impose cost on the defendant while
economizing its own cost, thus forcing the defendant to settle even though there is not enough
merit in the U.S. system.389 Although whether the loser pays rule deters frivolous suits more
or not compared to the American rule is still debatable,390 it would be safe to assume that the
incentive to make the other party incur litigation cost will generally be lower in a loser pays
system.391
Moreover, as we have seen, there is a cap in the German fee shifting rule which can be calculated ex ante.392 If there is no cap on fee shifting, there will be a chilling effect on the plaintiff
who will likely spend less on litigation compared to the defendant in a securities class action.393 The cap allows to mitigate the chilling effect.394 Also, the plaintiff can roughly esti-
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mate the amount he will have to pay to defendant in case of a loss before deciding to go forward.395 However, for this system to work in the U.S., there should be a rule with a formula to
calculate the cap on fees allowed to be shifted. This may or may not be a function of the
amount at stake for the plaintiff, or the class as a whole.396

III. Conclusion
There is much active discussion to reform the U.S. securities class action as we have seen in
Part II. While the German civil procedure system has some merits which could be considered
to improve U.S. securities class action, it cannot address the core issue being debated in the
U.S., since each system has its distinct characteristics. With this in mind, we will address the
role of opt-out class action on deterring fraud in the German context.

E. Deterring Corporate Fraud in Germany
As we have seen in Part II, it is the practice in the U.S. when a securities class actions settles,
D&O insurance companies covers the costs with the corporation indemnifying the individual
directors and officers. The process is quite different in Germany. In Germany, the individual
person who is responsible for the misrepresentation is typically not a party of the securities
action. When executive bodies of a corporation breach their duties by violating disclosure
obligations on the primary or secondary market, they are liable.397 In Germany (as well as
Switzerland and Austria), this liability however generally exists only towards the corporation
itself and only in very rare exceptions directly towards shareholders or third parties.398

I. Managerial Liability of Securities Litigation in Germany: Law in Book
Because this practice has to do with the German substantive law, a brief explanation is in order. In Germany, there is a very strong differentiation between liability for failure to disclose
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material information on primary and on secondary market. 399 For liability on the primary
market there is a multitude of statutory bases, namely (1) prospectus liability pursuant to the
German Securities Prospectus Act (Wertpapierprospektgesetz - WpPG400) with a total of five
statutory bases, (2) prospectus liability pursuant to the German Asset Investment Act (Vermögensanlagegesetz - VermAnlG401) with a total of three statutory bases, (3) prospectus liability pursuant to § 306 of the German Capital Investment Act (Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch KAGB402), (4) prospectus liability pursuant to general civil law and (5) liability for faulty offer documents pursuant to § 12 of the German Securities Purchase and Acquisition Act
(Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz - WpÜG403).404
The secondary market for securities is mainly governed by the German Securities Trading Act
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz - WpHG405).406 The most relevant liability norms are §§ 37b, 37c
WpHG, which provide a basis for claims against (only) the corporation because of failure to
disclose or faulty disclosure of material information by means of ad-hoc publicity.407
Managerial liability on the other hand is divided into internal and external liability.408 In this
context, internal liability means liability towards the corporation as a legal entity and external
liability means - direct - liability towards shareholders or third parties.409 External liability is
very uncommon in Germany.410 This is caused by a lack of statutory basis for such claims.
There are only very limited possibilities to bring an action against a manager pursuant to general civil contract or tort law statutes of the German Civil Code and they generally only apply
if the manager acted willfully.411 In 2004, there was an initiative to institute a more severe
managerial liability through the introduction of a “Capital Market Information Liability Act"
(Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetz - KapInHaG412), which would enable shareholders
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to sue the manager directly more easily.413 The initiative however was heavily opposed by
scholars and the business world, so it was eventually dropped.414
Other possible enforcers are the general assembly (with a simple majority vote) or a minority
of shareholders (holding at least 1% or 100,000 EUR in shares) through a derivative suit.415
However, derivative suits are quite uncommon in Germany.416 This leaves the corporation to
claim liability to its managers. And claims that the corporation has against its managers are as
a general rule to be brought by the supervisory board.417 As to this liability, the substantive
law of Germany is quite strict as the standard for managers to be liable for violating duty of
care to the corporation is negligence.418 Although Germany has adopted its own version of the
Business Judgment Rule, it gives less protection to German managers compared to the U.S.
counterparts.419 Moreover, when a director is found to be personally liable to the corporation
for violating duty of care, then the directors are liable to compensate the corporation fully.420

II. D&O Insurance and Managerial Liability in Germany
However, German managers are not without protection. In Germany, D&O insurance (which
was first introduced in Germany in 1986421), is the norm (at least for publicly traded corporations) although it is not mandatory.422 The corporation pays for the insurance coverage for its
managers as a group, so the policy is priced by the D&O insurance corporation considering
the risks of all board members and executives as an aggregate.423 But in order to prevent the
existence of D&O insurances from incentivizing managerial misbehavior, § 93 para. 2 sent. 3
AktG asserts that at least 10% (at least 1.5 times the fixed annual salary) of the claim have to
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be borne by the manager personally. 424 Managers may privately insure for the remaining
10%.425
Does the supervisory board enforce actively on the mangers? It is difficult to answer this
question. There is not much publicly available data on how many claims are brought against
managers. Corporations do not have a duty to disclose such information under German law
and have no interest in doing so because of the negative publicity.426
Studies assert that supervisory boards are reluctant to sue the managers.427 The reason for this
may the fact that the supervisory board fears that their own breach of duty of care may surface
during the process of enforcement against managers.428 Even if the supervisory board is not
legally liable, because it is the supervisory board who appoints the managers, the supervisory
board would still not want to risk being shown to be responsible for the misconduct of the
managers. 429 However, other studies suggest differently. For example, studies show that
16.67% of all D&O insurance contracts where at least once relied on during a time period of
10 years. 430 Another one estimates that German courts hold approximately 6,000 manager
liability actions with 2 or 3 defendants on average.431 The study also estimates that about 60%
of the payout by the insurance company is used to pay the fees for the lawyers.432
Although, it is hard to find conclusive empirical evidence on this point, it is possible that today the supervisory boards are more aggressively filing suits against the managers.433 In Germany, the Federal Supreme Court held that the decision whether to bring a damages claim
against members of the executive board is not subject to the business judgment of the supervi-
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sory board.434 So, the supervisory board may have to file and pursue a claim against the managers.435
If there are indeed active filings of the supervisory board against managers, then why do we
not see many court decisions in Germany? The reason could be the same reason as in the
U.S., that is most cases are either being dismissed or settled.436
There are some possible rationales for the supervisory board to opt for settlement in such a
case. The first rationale seems to be the fee shifting rule. The corporation may settle because
of the possibility of paying for the legal fees in case the corporation loses.437 But because
there is a cap on the amount of fee which may be shifted in Germany, and because the rule
regarding the manager’s duty of care violation is strict, the supervisory board will have less
reason to fear defeat.
Secondly, the corporation may opt to settle to keep the negative information out of the
press.438 Since court decisions have more chances of being accessed by the public compared
to the settlement, the corporation may want to settle rather than pursue the litigation. This
may be something that can be made as a business decision. However, although the company
may be able to keep the details of the case from the public by settling the case, it is not clear
whether settling the case will allow to keep the entire facts from the market, let alone the fact
that there has been a case.
Another rationale has to do with the current D&O insurance practice in Germany. As have
seen above, currently German D&O insurance is a group insurance in the sense that the exec-
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utive board and the supervisory board is insured by the same policy.439 When managers are
sued by the corporation headed by the supervisory board, the managers may retaliate by giving third party notice to the individual supervisory board members alleging liability of the
supervisory board member.440 When the supervisory board risks being sued, the supervisory
board has to consider the possibility of the bucket being depleted when the supervisory board
needs the policy at a later date.441 Although this problem may directly affect the incentive of
the supervisory board to settle, there is a proposal to solve this problem by keeping the insurance of the executive board and the supervisory board separate.442 By keeping the insurance
policy of the supervisory board separate from the policy of managers, it will be possible to
allow the supervisory board to pursue the case without being tempted to settle.443

III. Implementation of US Style Class Action and Manager Misconduct Deterrence
As we have seen, securities litigation is not common in Germany compared to the U.S. What
would happen if U.S. style class action is implemented? Although there are differences in
systems which may lead to different results as seen above, it may be possible to incentivize
the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney to file more securities class actions. Because the managers are not a party to the securities class action in Germany, the case will not be resolved
with the corporation indemnifying the managers like in the U.S.
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Because of the duty of the supervisory board to file claims against managers for violation of
their duties, and because of the rule not allowing the corporation to cover the managers in full
by D&O insurance in Germany,444 there may actually be deterrence effects to the manager’s
conducts. Moreover, there may still be some deterrence effect even if the corporation ends up
settling with the managers, as the manager will be paying from his pocket in the form of a
deductible or private insurance policy.445

F. Conclusion
It is hard to predict whether U.S. style class action will work in Germany. There are many
possible obstacles. There may be political obstacles which resist the implementation at all.
There are legal obstacles which may act as barriers to implementation such as constitutional
constraints, or which may act as barriers to use in practice such as lack of discovery system as
we have seen above. Yet we also find German legal rules which show some attributes that
may allow the U.S. securities class action to deter the misconduct of managers more effectively.
However, the actual effect on deterrence may give rise to a new problem which we do not
address here, that is whether the U.S. style securities class action will work as an over deterrence mechanism if implemented.446 This is an issue that will have to be addressed with specific context at a later date.
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